

# **McAfee Nitro Intrusion Prevention System 9.1**

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# **Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme**

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 i to iii, 1 to 9



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# FOREWORD

The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a thirdparty evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.

A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of *ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories*. Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the Standards Council of Canada.

The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements.

This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 27 November 2013, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project).

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#### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Disclaimer i					
Forewordii					
Executive Summary					
1	Identification of Target of Evaluation	2			
2	TOE Description	2			
3	Evaluated Security Functionality	2			
4	4 Security Target				
5	Common Criteria Conformance	3			
6	Security Policy	3			
7	Assumptions and Clarification of Scope	3			
7. 7.					
8	Evaluated Configuration	4			
9	Documentation	4			
10	Evaluation Analysis Activities	5			
11	ITS Product Testing	6			
1 1 1	.1Assessment of Developer Tests6.2INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING6.3INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING7.4CONDUCT OF TESTING7.5TESTING RESULTS7				
12	Results of the Evaluation	7			
13	Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations	8			
14	Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations	8			
15	15 References				

## **Executive Summary**

McAfee Nitro Intrusion Prevention System 9.1 (hereafter referred to as McAfee IPS 9.1), from McAfee, Inc., is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented evaluation.

McAfee IPS 9.1 provides a scalable enterprise security solution that provides intrusion prevention or intrusion detection, network event and/or flow data acquisition, network behavior analysis, and security event management that enables administrators to secure their networks with real-time threat mitigation. The TOE's IPS component can pass, drop, and log packets as they arrive, based on administrator configurable rules. When IPS is performing intrusion detection, it is said to be operating in an "IDS mode", when performing intrusion prevention, it is said to be operating in an "IPS mode".

EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 20 November 2013 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for McAfee IPS 9.1, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) to which it is asserted that the product satisfies its security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)<sup>1</sup> for this product provide sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 2 *augmented* assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC\_FLR.2 – Flaw Reporting Procedures.

Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares that the McAfee IPS 9.1 evaluation meets all the conditions of the *Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates* and that the product will be listed on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

# **1** Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented evaluation is McAfee Nitro Intrusion Prevention System 9.1 (hereafter referred to as McAfee IPS 9.1), from McAfee, Inc.

### 2 **TOE Description**

McAfee IPS 9.1 provides a scalable enterprise security solution that provides intrusion prevention or intrusion detection, network event and/or flow data acquisition, network behavior analysis, and security event management that enables administrators to secure their networks with real-time threat mitigation. The TOE's IPS component can pass, drop, and log packets as they arrive, based on administrator configurable rules. When IPS is performing intrusion detection, it is said to be operating in an "IDS mode", when performing intrusion prevention, it is said to be operating in an "IPS mode".

### **3** Evaluated Security Functionality

The complete list of evaluated security functionality for McAfee IPS 9.1 is identified in Section 6 of the ST.

The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithm was evaluated for correct implementation in McAfee IPS 9.1:

Cryptographic Algorithm	Standard	Certificate #
Advanced Encryption Standard	FIPS 197	2228
(AES)		

### 4 Security Target

The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:

Title: McAfee Nitro Intrusion Prevention System 9.1 Security Target v 1.3, October 30,
2013
Version: 1.3

Date: 30 October 2013

# 5 Common Criteria Conformance

The evaluation was conducted using the *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.* 

McAfee IPS 9.1 is:

- a. *Common Criteria Part 2 extended*; with functional requirements based upon functional components in Part 2, except for the following explicitly stated requirements defined in the ST:
  - IDS\_SDC System Data Collection;
  - IDS\_ANL Analyser Analysis;
  - IDS\_RCT Analyser React;
  - IDS\_RDR Restricted Data Review; and
  - IDS\_STG Management of System Data.
- b. *Common Criteria Part 3 conformant*, with security assurance requirements based only upon assurance components in Part 3; and
- c. *Common Criteria EAL 2 augmented*, containing all security assurance requirements in the EAL 2 package, as well as the following: ALC\_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures.

### 6 Security Policy

McAfee IPS 9.1 implements policies pertaining to security audit, cryptographic support, TSF protection, identification and authentication, intrusion detection and security management. Further details on these security policies may be found in Section 6 of the ST.

### 7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

Consumers of McAfee IPS 9.1 should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

#### 7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions

The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:

- There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains;
- The TOE will be managed in a manner that allows it to appropriately address changes in the IT system the TOE manages;

- The TOE is appropriately scalable to the IT system the TOE monitors;
- The TOE can only be accessed by authorized users;
- The authorized administrators are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation; and
- The TOE has access to all the IT system data it needs to perform its functions.

#### 7.2 Environmental Assumptions

The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:

- The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical access; and
- The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.

### 8 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration for McAfee IPS 9.1 comprises the following software components:

- Nitro IPS v 9.1.3
- McAfee ESM v 9.1.3

The components are deployed on a virtual machine running VMware ESXi 5.0.

The publication entitled McAfee Enterprise Security Manager Interface 9.1.3 ESMI Setup and Installation Guide, 2012, describes the procedures necessary to install and operate McAfee IPS 9.1 in its evaluated configuration.

#### 9 Documentation

The McAfee, Inc. documents provided to the consumer are as follows:

- McAfee Enterprise Security Manager Interface 9.1.3 ESM/Event Receiver VM Users Guide 2012;
- b. McAfee Enterprise Security Manager Interface 9.1.3 ESMI Users Guide 2012;
- c. McAfee Enterprise Security Manager Interface 9.1.3 ESMI Quick Start Guide 2012;
- d. McAfee Enterprise Security Manager Interface 9.1.3 ESMI Setup and Installation Guide 2012; and
- e. McAfee ESM Release 9.1.3 Release Notes, 15 October, 2012.

# **10** Evaluation Analysis Activities

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of McAfee IPS 9.1, including the following areas:

**Development:** The evaluators analyzed the McAfee IPS 9.1 functional specification and design documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the McAfee IPS 9.1 security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct.

**Guidance Documents:** The evaluators examined the McAfee IPS 9.1 preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

**Life-cycle support**: An analysis of the McAfee IPS 9.1 configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the McAfee IPS 9.1 configuration items were clearly marked. The developer's configuration management system was observed during a site visit, and it was found to be mature and well-developed.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of McAfee IPS 9.1 during distribution to the consumer.

The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by developer for the McAfee IPS 9.1. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the product.

**Vulnerability assessment**: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis of McAfee IPS 9.1. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a search of public domain vulnerability databases to identify McAfee IPS 9.1 potential vulnerabilities. The evaluators identified potential vulnerabilities; subsequent to follow-on penetration testing (ref: section 11.3) it was verified that none of the potential vulnerabilities were exploitable in the operational environment for McAfee IPS 9.1.

All these evaluation activities resulted in **PASS** verdicts.

# **11 ITS Product Testing**

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.

#### **11.1** Assessment of Developer Tests

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the  $ETR^2$ .

The evaluators analyzed the developer's test coverage analysis and found it to be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

#### **11.2 Independent Functional Testing**

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation, executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the developer tests.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the following list of EWA-Canada test goals:

- a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the developer's tests;
- b. Initialization: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that the TOE can be installed and configured into the evaluated configuration.
- c. Blacklist IP: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that events for a monitored host in the blacklist is logged;
- d. Xmas Tree scan detection: The objective of this test case is to confirm that the TOE can detect an Xmas Tree scan on its monitored subnet;
- e. Restarting TOE Components: The objective of this test case is to confirm that TOE components can be stopped, started and rebooted and return to operation correctly; and

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

f. FIPS Testing: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that the TOE is running in FIPS mode.

#### **11.3 Independent Penetration Testing**

Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:

- a. Port Scan: The objective of this test case is to confirm which ports are available;
- b. Information Leakage Verification: The objective of this test goal is to monitor for data leakage during startup, shutdown, login and other scenarios;
- c. Multi-Admin: The objective of this test case is to verify that multiple administrative sessions can make changes to the TOE correctly at the same time;
- d. Tampering: The objective of this test case is to sever connections with monitored devices, then re-establish connection and verify that event information is not lost; and
- e. SSH Port: The objective of this test case is to verify that an intruder cannot gain access to the TOE using SSH.

The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.

#### **11.4 Conduct of Testing**

McAfee IPS 9.1 was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information Technology Security Evaluation and Test (ITSET) Facility at EWA-Canada. The CCS Certification Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

#### 11.5 Testing Results

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, giving assurance that McAfee IPS 9.1 behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.

### **12** Results of the Evaluation

This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 2+ level of assurance. The overall verdict for the evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

# **13** Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations

The customer is reminded to follow all supplied guidance documentation when installing the TOE in its intended environment, and ensure it is operating in FIPS mode and using a strong password policy.

### 14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations

Acronym/Abbreviation/	Description		
<b>Initialization</b>			
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard		
CCEF	Common Criteria Evaluation Facility		
CCS	Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and		
	Certification Scheme		
CPL	Certified Products list		
CM	Configuration Management		
IDS	Intrusion Detection System		
IPS	Intrusion Prevention System		
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level		
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report		
IT	Information Technology		
ITSET	Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing		
PALCAN	Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada		
SFR	Security Functional Requirement		
ST	Security Target		
TOE	Target of Evaluation		

### **15 References**

This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:

- a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
- b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
- c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.

- d. McAfee Nitro Intrusion Prevention System 9.1 Security Target v 1.3, October 30, 2013.
- e. Evaluation Technical Report for McAfee, Inc., McAfee Nitro Instrusion Prevention System 9.1, version 1.0, 20 November 2013.